ZEPRT Study Exposes Missteps at RTC

What Three Independent Reviews of the ZEPRT Study Found

Friends of the Rail & Trail reviewed the RTC's Zero Emission Passenger Rail and Trail study carefully. Then, to make sure we were reading it correctly, we reviewed the analysis of two independent expert teams as well. All three reviews reached the same conclusion: the ZEPRT cost estimates are not a reflection of what passenger rail in Santa Cruz County actually costs. They are a reflection of what the RTC leadership directed the consultants to produce.

Here is what we found.

The RTC Directed the ZEPRT Consultants to Make Rail Expensive

The ZEPRT study was produced by HDR Engineering under contract to the RTC. Four specific directives from RTC leadership, plus erroneous methodology used for calculating the contingency costs, drove the final ZEPRT price per mile estimate absurdly beyond comparable California rail projects. 

1. "Low maintenance" means brand-new everything.

RTC staff told HDR to plan a system with minimal maintenance needs. In rail planning, that is code for "make it expensive." The consultants state this trade-off in several places. 

"There is a trade-off insofar as capital costs for new track tend to be higher than for rehabilitated track, but maintenance requirements and costs for new track are substantially lower than those for rehabilitated track." — ZEPRT Study, p. 90

Because of the RTC request, HDR included the cost for full replacement of all track, ties, rail, fastening system, and ballast, rather than the more affordable rehabilitation option.

The same logic applied to bridges. Rather than pricing repairs or upgrades to existing timber bridges:

"SCCRTC has stated that it desires bridges with minimal maintenance needs…which results in replacement of existing timber bridges prior to ZEPRT passenger service being established." — ZEPRT Study, p. 60

 The independent engineering review commissioned by the Train Riders Association of California (TRAC) also found the ZEPRT estimated cost for bridge replacements were wildly out of scale compared to the normal cost for these types of bridges. 

2. Nearly $100 million in unnecessary land acquisition.

The ZEPRT study included close to $100 million in land purchases. The bulk of this was for a dedicated maintenance road running alongside the corridor instead of using the trail for emergency access, which is standard practice. The study also included the purchase of land for an arbitrary 200-foot buffer zone on both sides of the existing right-of-way.

"A conceptual buffer of 200 feet was applied around the ZEPRT Project concept extent, including potential passenger rail stations and a maintenance facility." — ZEPRT Study

The independent review found land acquisition of this scale would only be necessary to build freeway exits and new park-and-ride lots; elements are not needed here.  

3. A $253 million maintenance yard the consultants said isn't needed.

The ZEPRT study included $253,599,991 for a full, autonomous Layover and Maintenance Facility. Yet buried in the same study, the consultants noted:

"Layover and maintenance could be done at a shared facility somewhere else, rather than on the SCCRTC branch line… including the ability to accommodate select LMF functions off-site in the local area or also facilitate heavy maintenance activities at a nearby facility shared with other rail transit operators in the Northern California region." — ZEPRT Study, p. 223

In other words, we could partner with TAMC and use the new facility they are already building in Salinas.

4. Nearly $685 million in consulting fees — instead of hiring a staff engineer.

The ZEPRT study budgeted $684,553,405 in professional services. This figure would be substantially reduced if the RTC hired a supervising rail engineer on staff to oversee the project, which is a standard cost saving practice for agencies that manage major capital programs, rather than contracting every function out to consultants.

5. Erroneous Methodology Used for Calculating Contingency Costs

The RTC commissioned a peer review of the ZEPRT study. This expert panel specifically flagged the mysteriously high per-mile cost estimates. They recommended the RTC "consider doing a cost comparison with recent projects/estimates from similar projects like SMART and SBCTA… Cost per mile seems high comparative to relatable projects."

The RTC has failed to follow up on this recommendation. 

However, independent experts have surfaced one clue to this unusual and unprecedented estimate. After filing a public records request to obtain the costing spreadsheet used for the ZEPRT study, an independent engineering review commissioned by the Train Riders Association of California found that the ZEPRT team added contingency costs to each individual line item, and then added a second overall contingency cost to the total. This non-standard practice results in an estimated 130% contingency embedded in the final number. Standard practice is to include a 30% contingency.  Read the TRAC analysis here.

RTC Commission Directives Were Not Met

What a study omits can be as revealing as what it includes. The most glaring omissions in the ZEPRT study were the absence of any value engineering efforts and the absence of any consideration of phased implementation. The Commissioners asked for cost ranges and a project right-sized for our community. The ZEPRT study delivered neither. Instead, it delivered a gold-plated rail plan containing basic errors in cost estimating. 

This Is Not How You Estimate a Rail Project

In the absence of RTC follow-through on the peer review recommendations, local resident and rail analyst Jim MacKenzie did a comparison of costs, for comparable rail projects,  which was published in a Santa Cruz Sentinel Guest Commentary. His findings: the ZEPRT numbers don't hold up. Read his full analysis here.

For context: SMART — Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit — built a 70-mile electrified passenger rail system with more bridges than our corridor for under $2 billion. Our 22-mile project, as costed by the RTC, comes in at $4.3 billion.

The Real Cost of Leadership Missteps

Poor guidance and contingency costing errors in the ZEPRT study resulted in a false public impression that rail in Santa Cruz County is unaffordable. 

That false impression is now being used by the RTC and rail opponents to justify demolition of the tracks.

Here is what the RTC is not telling the public: Caltrans is already developing the rail project. The Santa Cruz Branch Line is part of the Central Coast Corridor in the federal Corridor Identification and Development Program. Caltrans will be examining the existing infrastructure and doing the value engineering and phased-implementation analysis that were left out of ZEPRT. 

But Caltrans needs the RTC to support the work. Not sabotage it. The biggest competitive advantage that our project has in terms of readiness is our existing rail line.  The FRA grants that fund Corridor ID are not infinite, and if the RTC tears out the tracks we are at risk of being bumped from funding.  

We call on the RTC commissioners to reject the demolition proposal, direct staff to conduct the cost comparison their own expert panel recommended, and right-size this project for the community it is meant to serve.

The tracks, once gone, do not come back. The decision the commission makes this summer is permanent.

Friends of the Rail & Trail (FORT) is a nonprofit organization advocating for the preservation of the Santa Cruz Branch Rail Line and the rail-with-trail corridor. Learn more and take action at railandtrail.org.