TRAC Review of Capital Costs, Zero Emission Passenger Rail Project (ZEPRT)

By Michael D. Setty, MUP

President, Train Riders Association of California (TRAC)

Two civil engineers, both registered Professional Engineers (P.E.) with the State of California, review an Excel spreadsheet of capital costs created for SCCRTC

Preface

In early 2021, the Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission (SCCRTC) was on the verge of approving a Business Plan outlining the Locally Preferred Alternative for the $465 million (2020 dollars), $700 million+/- (2025 dollars) Transit Corridor Alternatives Analysis. This process was interrupted by Santa Cruz Greenway’s work on a ballot initiative to remove rail references from the Santa Cruz County General Plan on the ballot, which it subsequently lost 73% no to 27% yes.

For some reason, SCCRTC failed to bring the Business Plan back to a Board vote after the strong community support for rail shown by the crushing defeat of the Greenway measure, later opting for yet another time-consuming study. This turned out to be a major missed opportunity since the then-Biden Administration dramatically expanded rail passenger programs. To an “outsider” such as myself (though I am from P.G.), this looks like a textbook case of extreme short-sightedness by weak local leadership.

Introduction

If SCCRTC’s consultant HDR had moderated their estimates based on other California regional rail projects, costs would be one-quarter to one-sixth the stated cost of $4.3 billion. There is the $700 million estimate for the 2021 Transit Corridor Alternatives Analysis. If the current $30 million per mile estimate for SMART’s Healdsburg extension which will soon start construction, the ZEPRT would cost around $660 million. 

If North San Diego County Sprinter construction costs for its 22-mile line (44% double track) between Oceanside and El Cajon were increased for inflation since $477 million in 2008, costs would be around $900 million+/- in 2025 assuming no “scope creep” or other significant changes.. Sprinter is notable 

For this analysis, the Train Riders Association of California (TRAC) and the Transportation Solutions Defense and Education Fund (TRANSDEF), asked two civil engineers with many decades of experience, both registered Professional Engineers (P.E.) with the State of California, to review a detailed Excel spreadsheet of capital costs created for SCCRTC by the study consultant HDR and obtained by TRANSDEF from SCCRTC through a California Public Records Act (PRA) request.

The first P.E. who agreed to examine the HDR spreadsheet has over a half-century of civil engineering experience. He operated an extremely well-known engineering firm in the Bay Area for more than 30 years, and which was sold to a major U.S. engineering company. After that sale, he worked for various major firms in a senior capacity, including work on the high-speed rail proposal between Southern California and Las Vegas now under construction by Brightline West.

The second P.E. who agreed to help TRAC and TRANSDEF worked in a civil engineering capacity for the Southern Pacific Railroad for decades prior to its merger with the Union Pacific, and since then until his recent retirement for various engineering firms including HDR for a time. This individual has been an important resource for TRANSDEV in various projects and legal cases.

My background includes a Master of Urban Planning (MUP) from San Jose State University. I have worked in various transit planning, administrative, and financial roles for nearly a half-century. The signature achievement of my career was a major role in development and successful implementation of high-speed ferries between Vallejo and San Francisco, the first instance of the technology in the United States at the time. Since semi-retiring from being a transit consultant, I have written many articles and rail advocacy documents for TRAC including https://calrailnews.org/trac-releases-santa-cruz-rail-study/.

Our Findings

We find that the HDR-estimated costs of $4.3 billion for the 22-mile Santa Cruz County ZEPRT to be patently absurd. We don’t understand how such an absurd document would be released by professionals. The alleged cost of $4.3 billion is an order of magnitude higher than any comparable project. We understand that rail construction unit costs in the U.S. are high compared to Europe and Asia, but how did estimates balloon 600% from $700 million+/- (adjusted for inflation) compared to the previous Transit Corridor Alternative Analysis, to nearly $4.3 billion for the ZEPRT? Rail construction costs have ballooned 40%-60% since 2021, not nine-fold as the HDR estimate implies.

Both of P.E.-holding engineers helping TRAC and TRANSDEF in this analysis agreed that the base unit construction and materials costs in the HDR estimate were reasonable, i.e., for items such as rails, ties, switches, costs for earth-moving, signaling, stations, and other “hard” costs. Vehicle costs seemed “reasonable,” based on the assumed use of hydrogen-powered multiple units such as those contracted by the San Bernardino County Transportation Authority and State of California. 

They and I disagreed with the relatively high contingency and engineering costs used by the HDR estimates for the ZEPRT. Normally, a 30% contingency for unknown factors has been applied to civil engineering projects such as for rail construction and rehabilitation. On top of this, another 10% allowance for project engineering, and 10% for project management and owner costs (e.g., project administration by SCCRTC). This is a total of 50% added to base unit costs; however, the HDR estimate assumption came to 100% at this stage. On top of this, the HDR estimate added a 40% additional contingency which resulted in a total project cost of about $4.3 billion on an inflated project cost of about $3.0 billion.

So base costs soared nearly three times in the HDR estimates, including some items that were inflated from earlier estimates, e.g., single track railroad bridge replacement costs. There were other inflated or unneeded items, discussed after bridges below.

La Selva Trestle Replacement is the Touchstone, Not HDR Estimates

As we have noted before, the largest anomaly in the HDR cost estimates beside questionable application of contingencies are its estimated bridge costs. Standard single-track railroad bridges should cost relatively little to repair, and perhaps $10,000-$30,000 per track foot to replace, the cost range depending on project complexity and bridge design variables such as height or size of substructure elements. 

The replacement of the 500-foot± La Selva Trestle completed in 2014-2015 (https://sccrtc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Rail-LaSelvaTrestle_2014Sep.pdf) for about $4 million is the touchstone for bridge repairs on the Santa Cruz Rail Branch Line, not some clearly irrelevant consultant studies.

Unneeded or Excessively Specified Items

The HDR estimates and the ZEPRT do not adequately explain the need for more than $100 million (±120 acres; base costs, nearly $300 million with various HDR specified contingencies) for additional rail right of way.

Is HDR proposing to build freeway offramps to various ZEPRT park and ride lots, with around $100 million (base costs, nearly $300 million with various HDR-applied contingencies)?

Why nearly $100 million (base costs, nearly $300 million with various HDR-applied contingencies)? Environmental conditions within the Branch Line ought to be well known by the line’s owner, SCCRTC.

In addition to what we believe are wildly inflated bridge costs, the above categories add nearly $1 billion to the project total with all HDR-applied contingencies.

Here are some comments from one of our P.E’s:

- Bridge structures need to be ID'd by MP.  I assume these costs are for upgrades to the existing structures, not replacement costs??  Cost are too general.

-  Heavy maintenance facility.  Too much for a light rail facility unless they plan to repair rolling stock and locos other than the Santa Cruz branch.

-  MOW [building] too much.  Should be less than $10m

-  Yard track.  too much.  What are they building, an intermodal yard??

-  No description of where the cuts/fill located.  Why so much earthwork?  Even double tracking shouldn't require this.

-  Environmental mitigation.  Shouldn't be so expensive for repair of existing.  Only if they are filling wetlands or redoing bridge piers.

-  Need more $ for MOW vehicles.

The other P.E. we discussed this project with mostly commented that (1) unit costs except bridges were reasonable, but (20 he believed contingencies were too high and were applied in odd ways.

Conclusion

SCCRTC should “accept” the HDR-authored Concept Report as given, but not “endorse” it. The ZEPRT Concept Report still contains much useful information, even if estimated capital costs are utterly useless (estimated operating costs are within the range” for such rail projects, if on the high side with room for economies).

SCCRTC should continue to the environmental and preliminary engineering phase with anew RFP process for consultants, perhaps using the 2021 Transit Corridor Alternatives Analysis as the realistic baseline (with ZEPRT process as an information, not cost resource)

SCCRTC should also convene an outside panel of experts, including those from the Mineta Transportation Institute as San Jose State University, disinterested engineering firms, and independent civil engineering P.E.s to help the Commission develop realistic capital cost estimates and operating plans.

Appendix 1

(Less Than 100 Feet, Flat Terrain)

Project Name	Location	Span Length	Details	Estimated Cost	Status
Tennessee Short Line Railroads Bundle	Tennessee	<100 ft (not specified)	Part of 42-bridge upgrade; short spans, steel/concrete, flat terrain.	$300,000–$500,000/bridge	Announced 2023
Indiana Rail Road (Crawford County)	Illinois (near Indiana)	<100 ft (not specified)	Replaced 9 timber bridges with concrete; short spans, rural flat areas.	$355,000/bridge	Completed post-2019
Georgia Southwestern Railroad	Georgia	20–80 ft	Upgraded 13 timber bridges to steel/concrete; short spans, flat terrain.	$150,000–$300,000/bridge	Completed post-2019
Kanawha River Railroad (KNWA)	Ohio/West Virginia	<100 ft (not specified)	Rehabbed multiple short-span bridges; some flat terrain, creek crossings.	$200,000–$400,000/bridge	Funded 2023
Eastern Arizona Rail Safety	Arizona	<100 ft (not specified)	Replaced 3 timber bridges; short spans, flat/gently sloping terrain.	$300,000–$500,000/bridge	Announced 2024

Table 2: Major Railroad Bridge Replacement Projects (Spans 100–1,000 Feet, Single Track, 20–80 Feet High)

Project Name	Location	Span Length	Details	Estimated Cost	Status
Big Bayou Canot Railroad Bridge	Alabama	270 ft	20–30 ft high over waterway; steel truss replacement estimate.	$5–7 million	Upgraded post-2000s
Rockport Railroad Bridge	Kentucky	400 ft	30–50 ft high over Green River; rehabbed, full replacement estimate.	$20–25 million (est.)	Funded 2022
Kanawha River Railroad (KNWA)	Ohio/West Virginia	150–200 ft	20–40 ft high over Little Kanawha River; steel girder.	$4–6 million	Funded 2023
Eastern Idaho Railroad Bridge	Idaho	120 ft	25–35 ft high over US-91 roadway; steel girder replacement.	$3–4 million (2025 adj.)	Completed post-2019
Blatnik Bridge (Scaled Example)	Wisconsin/Minnesota	500 ft (est.)	50–80 ft high over St. Louis River; steel truss estimate.	$25–35 million (est.)	Announced 2024

Notes on span lengths:

• Short-Span Projects: The document specifies “less than 100 feet” for all but provides an exact range (20–80 ft) only for Georgia Southwestern. Others are assumed to be under 100 ft, with no precise lengths given, so it is noted “<100 ft (not specified)” where applicable.

• Major Projects: Exact lengths are provided (e.g., 270 ft for Big Bayou Canot, 400 ft for Rockport, 120 ft for Eastern Idaho), while Kanawha River offers a range (150–200 ft). Blatnik is an estimate (500 ft) scaled from a larger project to fit the 100–1,000 ft criteria.